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Abstract—Existing HW/SW platforms for safety-critical sys-
tems suffer from limited performance and/or from lack of
flexibility due to building on specific proprietary components.
This jeopardizes their wide deployment across domains. While
some research has been done to overcome these limitations,
they have had limited success owing to missing flexibility and
extensibility. Flexibility and extensibility are the cornerstones
of industry adoption: industries dealing in capital goods need
technologies on which they can rely on during decades (e.g.
avionics, space, automotive).
SELENE aims at covering this gap by proposing a new
family of safety-critical computing platforms, which builds upon
open source components such as the RISC-V instruction set
architecture, GNU/Linux, and the Jailhouse hypervisor. SELENE
will develop an advanced computing platform that is able to:
(1) adapt the system to the specific requirements of different
application domains, to changing environmental conditions, and
to internal conditions of the system itself; (2) allow the integration
of applications of different criticalities and performance demands
in the same platform, guaranteeing functional and temporal
isolation properties; (3) achieve flexible diverse redundancy by
exploiting the inherent redundant capabilities of the multicore;
and (4) efficiently execute compute-intensive applications by
means of specific accelerators.
Index Terms—safety, high-performance computing, au-
tonomous systems
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the safety critical systems market has
been growing quickly, chiefly because of the advent of new
applications such as autonomous driving systems. Autonomy
has reached the safety critical systems market spurred by
the availability of low cost, reduced size and low power,
high-performance embedded computing platforms able to host
computationally intensive applications in real-time. However,
the validation of safe and reliable operation of such complex
platforms (at reasonable cost) is still an open problem that
calls for novel and viable design approaches.
SELENE aims at covering this gap by proposing a new
family of safety-critical computing platforms enabling the use
of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and building upon open source
RISC-V-based components. SELENE will develop a high-
performance computing platform that is able to: (1) adapt the
system to the specific requirements of different application
domains, to the changing environmental conditions and to the
internal conditions of the system itself; (2) allow the integra-
tion of applications of different criticalities and performance
demands in the same platform, while guaranteeing functional
and temporal isolation properties; (3) achieve flexible diverse
redundancy by exploiting the inherent redundant capabilities
of multicore architectures; and (4) efficiently execute compute-
intensive applications by means of specific accelerators. These
features will be achieved while complying with safety require-
ments and considering security aspects by construction.
To efficiently execute AI on our hardware platform, we
will incorporate state-of-the-art machine learning accelerators
tailored to safety-critical system applications. AI software
will be executed using an execution strategy that enables the
coexistence of tasks with different criticalities. In particular,
SELENE, using an open source software stack, will allow
the coexistence of applications with mixed integrity levels
within the same hardware platform preserving their assurance
as needed, in line with appropriate standards and qualification
guidelines, but without comprising maximum performance that
other applications with less stringent safety requirements may
require. This will be achieved by using lightweight hardware
and software isolation features where needed.
SELENE targets a wide range of safety-critical domains
and will provide the community with a key building block
to facilitate the development of new autonomous and critical
applications in emerging domains. To validate the flexibility of
the platform, SELENE will deploy four different use-cases: the
SPIDER autonomous robotic platform from Virtual Vehicles,
a highly-integrated satellite application from Airbus Defense
and Space (France), a human flight space application from
Airbus Defense and Space (Germany), and an autonomous
train application from CAF signalling. The SELENE HW



























































Fig. 1. Baseline SELENE SoC architecture.
SW stack will be deployed to support the different use case
needs. SELENE will deliver proofs-of-concept at TRL4-5 at
the end of the project and will explicitly pave the road towards
higher TRL. SELENE started in December 2019 and will last
until December 2022.
II. SELENE HARDWARE PLATFORM
SELENE will develop a heterogeneous multicore processor
platform based on the open RISC-V Instruction Set Ar-
chitecture (ISA). This multicore processor will expose the
parallel, redundant computational resources in the chip to meet
different safety, performance, security and power requirements
for different applications and domains. To allow meeting safety
requirements in several domains, SELENE will develop a
multi-standard safety-IP library of extended functionalities for
testing, diagnosing, debugging and monitoring the platform as
well as isolating and protecting the applications executing on
it. Mechanisms such as hardware virtualization will be used
to isolate applications from each other and protect the system.
The SELENE hardware platform relies on a modular,
existing system-on-chip (SoC) design that will be adapted
to fit the needs of the project use-cases. Figure 1 shows
the architecture of the baseline SoC. The General Purpose
Processing (GPP) elements consist of one or several Cobham
Gaisler NOEL-V [8] superscalar, in-order RISC-V RV64GC
processors. These cores are able to provide the same type
of fault-tolerance features as current European space-grade
LEON processors meeting the stringent requirements of space
end users. The NOEL-V core matches ARMs Cortex-A53
processor performance per MHz. The development work an-
ticipates a future certification effort toward safety standards
such as IEC 61508 Ed 2.
Current state-of-the-art microprocessor implementations
with extensive sharing of resources suffer from timing in-
terference. The SELENE platform will provide a high-speed
interconnect with traffic flow isolation properties to enable
guarantees between the contenders for shared resources (GPP,
IO and accelerator elements compete for access to non-local
memory). A concern for the implementation of safety-critical
systems is the observability and guarantee of correct hardware
functions on which software depends to provide safety. Thus,
the SELENE hardware platform will provide the necessary
Fig. 2. SELENE SW Architecture.
debug and monitor visibility within and around the SoC
elements to meet these needs.
III. SELENE SOFTWARE PLATFORM
SELENE will exploit the capabilities of a heterogeneous,
high-performance, and certifiable hardware platform with the
development of an appropriate high-integrity-level-capable
open-source software layer that relying on built-in hardware
features delivers safety-critical amenable services. For this pur-
pose, SELENE will make direct use of Linux in cooperation
with the SIEMENS Jailhouse open source hypervisor running
on top of a RISC-V platform. Figure 2 shows the software
architecture of SELENE.
A. Linux for Safety-critical Applications
GNU/Linux is one of the most popular Operating Systems
for non-safety critical systems. Currently, it is the leading OS
for supercomputing, public cloud, and smartphone domains. In
addition, it has an important role within embedded systems,
with an estimated deployment rate of 62% [4]. Although these
applications are non-safety critical, different industrial and
economical sectors also rely on GNU/Linux for their critical
applications, such as the telecommunications industry.
The need for high-complexity applications in safety-critical
systems makes Linux a good open source candidate within
SELENE. Linux based systems provide a number of mecha-
nisms that allow an optimal utilization of the given resources
while providing outstanding security capabilities (protection
and monitoring). In order to build a mixed-critical system, it is
necessary to establish and maintain sufficient isolation between
zones of different criticality, sometimes also between different
functionalities with identical criticality (safety function from
monitoring, diverse safety function implementations from each
other, incremental integration and qualification). When porting
and consolidating these functionalities on a system with a
shared processor and other shared resources, isolation has to
be achieved at a higher level, using a combination of hardware
and software measures. One approach is to use the isolation
of Linux between applications it can host. Such an approach
is taken in the SIL2LinuxMP [14] project and its successor
ELISA [6] by using Linux kernel mechanisms to achieve the
required separation. Those mechanisms are also used to isolate
processes or groups of processes, including containers, from
each other and are primarily implemented in software at the
operating system level.
However, the number of interfaces and functionalities of
the OS kernel that need to be considered to achieve isolation
can be significant. They may grow in number, complexity
and diversity as the OS evolves limiting the flexibility of
the platform. Changes to the OS kernel, e.g. to add func-
tionality for non-critical functions or address security issues
in the latter, require re-certification of the OS. Thus, as
a complementary solution to such a monolithic approach,
SELENE will use an hypervisor that intercepts the interaction
of the operating system with the hardware allowing partitioned
access to shared resources and potential multiple guest oper-
ating systems execution. Hypervisor takes over the burden of
isolating workloads from each other that are run in different
instances of operating systems, or even with only a minimal
runtime environment (bare metal).
B. The Jailhouse Approach to Static Partitioning
The point of introducing hypervisor technology into safety-
critical systems is to reduce the burden of certification by
“walling in” subsystems. Properly walled-in subsystems can-
not impact other subsystems. Hence, only the safety-critical
subsystems and the hypervisor itself require certification.
However, depending on its functionality, the complexity
of a general-purpose hypervisor can easily match or exceed
the complexity of an operating system. In that case, moving
the partitioning duty from an OS to a hypervisor would not
simplify system certification. To the contrary, it would make
it more complex by effectively duplicating the effort needed
for system-level software (OS used for safety critical parts and
hypervisor).
The central tenet underlying the design of Jailhouse is to
ease certification through maximally simple design. Jailhouse
was developed around a concept of static partitions used to
keep the independent execution of operating systems in check.
Jailhouse key design principles are:
• No scheduling, only 1:1 resource assignments:
– One (or more) CPU cores 7→ one guest. Multiple
guests are never scheduled on the same CPU core.
– One device 7→ one guest. Device sharing is man-
aged by the guest owning the device (by providing
services to other guests).
• Focus on maintaining static partitions: dynamic reconfig-
uration while the critical system parts are in service is
not possible.
• Freezing platform hardware configuration after boot-up in
known-good state (late partitioning), rather than booting
the system via the hypervisor and virtualizing the boot-
up of standard guests. (This depends somewhat on the
processor architecture).
• Prefer matured hardware-assisted virtualization and re-
source partitioning features over software approaches
(including paravirtualization)
Following these principles, the current code base of the
Jailhouse hypervisor is able to stay below 10,000 lines of code
(C and assembly) per target architecture (currently supporting
x86, ARMv7 and ARMv8). This offers a high degree of
flexibility with respect to certification approaches and the
safety-conforming management of the code base. These are
the main reasons for its deployment and extension to support
additional safety and security-related features in the SELENE
computing platform.
C. Artificial Intelligence Libraries
A key aspect of autonomous systems is the use of AI
techniques including considering these advanced technologies
for critical decision making. This only can be tackled in a safe
way if the highly complex AI components can safety co-exist
with low-complexity checkers or monitors as well as diverse
independent concurrent implementation forming architectural
protection schemes for complex technologies.
We will deploy artificial intelligence (AI) techniques on
the SELENE platform isolating these by partitioning mecha-
nisms provided by Jailhouse and GNU/Linux to enforce non-
interference with other critical components. In particular, in
the context of the SELENE project we will port the Euro-
pean Distributed Deep Learning Library [15] to the SELENE
computing platform.
Common AI methods currently are not assessed for robust-
ness against random faults, notably it is unclear at present
what inherent robustness properties they may possess against
control-flow errors or data errors. Given the algorithmic ro-
bustness against input noise it can be speculated that AI
algorithms actually fare well with some types of random
faults in data - what level of robustness they actually expose
is though an open question. Further the issue of protecting
against systematic faults in a highly complex pre-existing
element like EDDL is an open issue. How to protect an AI
executable so as to allow giving guarantees - or at least a
quantitative assurance of the results emitted is a topic we will
investigate in the context of SELENE deployment of EDDL.
Safety related executables making critical decisions based
on AI require AI systems to provide a quantification of
their uncertainty (algorithmic as well as their susceptibility to
random faults). A research target of SELENE is to explore
options to quantify the reliance that can be placed on AI
components in a safety related system.
Methods to achieve protection of AI components seen as
worth exploring are diversity based approaches currently being
used in ensemble based optimizations. Such methods may
also serve the safety needs for fail-operational autonomous
systems. In SELENE we propose to use ensembles of neural
networks in order to provide robustness of model rather than
focusing on optimization issues. The challenges raised are
the considerable memory needs as well as the computa-
tional demands of AI (e.g. deep convolution neural networks)
which run contrary to the traditional keep-it-simple principle.
Questions of how to achieve adequate system level integrity
for the class of RAM/CPU intensive tasks, in general and
considering randomness based algorithms commonly used in
AI, are currently not addressed by FuSa standards and state-
of-the-art FuSa techniques.
IV. FLEXIBLE SELF-MONITORED PLATFORM FOR SAFETY
CRITICAL APPLICATIONS
The goal of SELENE is to build a computing platform
that facilitates the certification of complex safety critical
applications. To achieve this goal, SELENE relies on two key
aspects: on-line monitoring capabilities, and spatial isolation.
SELENE monitoring capabilities will be provided with
specific hardware support that will be triggered by software
means. In particular, hardware monitoring support will be
incorporated in those components whose behaviour can lead
to safety goal violations. These critical components are for
instance the memory management unit (MMU), the perfor-
mance monitoring unit (PMU), and the various fault detection
and correction mechanisms (e.g error correction codes, and
comparators). To enable software-triggered monitoring the SE-
LENE platform includes a hardware monitoring unit (HMU).
The goal of SELENE monitoring capabilities is twofold.
First, during the verification step, the HMU allows collecting
evidence on conforming to safety requirements. Once the
system has been deployed, the HMU allows software monitors
and applications to learn about the actual status of the platform
during the lifetime of the same; raising alarms when limits
have been exceeded.
Spatial isolation will be applied by leveraging the ca-
pabilities of the Jailhouse hypervisor. Additional hardware
support combining isolation and monitoring capabilities will
be included in these hardware features for which software
virtualization is not enough (see Figure 3). For instance, shared
resources such as caches and the network-on-chip (NoC)
will be adapted in SELENE to enable the co-existence of
tasks with different criticality in the same hardware platform.
SELENE interconnect will be designed to combine innovative
techniques for partitioning and monitoring [3], [13]. Physical
NoC partitioning will be carried out at a coarse-grain level
using virtual channels or virtual networks to isolate different
traffic flows. We will also explore more fine-grain isolation
techniques using TDM-based packets scheduling [13].
Finally, SELENE will support multiple configuration op-
tions (flexibility) to address safety and performance needs
from diverse applications. Limited but key modifications in
specific hardware components allow reconciliation of require-
ments from several application domains on a single computing
platform. Figure 3 shows a particular instance of the SELENE
platform. This plot shows how the SELENE platform has been
adapted to execute two highly critical fail-operation tasks and
a performance demanding AI application.
A. Flexible Support for Diverse Redundancy
Safety-critical systems are designed to be robust against
hardware faults. This is specially important in some environ-
ments (e.g. space) where random hardware faults can be more
frequent and potentially lead to system failure. To shield such
systems against that possibility, engineers introduce mecha-
nisms to detect and mitigate faults that can affect the entire
platform and compromise its safety.
Especially for complex processor cores targeting safety
critical applications proper verification and fault diagnosis
throughout the whole design process are essential. SELENE
sets special focus on fault analysis techniques to enable
early detection and mitigation of common-cause faults. One
major research area is about closing fault coverage holes
by proposing additional safety mechanisms and estimating
diagnostic coverage. Important questions in product design
adress which safety architectures are best suited with respect to
power, performance and resource utilization (e.g. area). Safety
challenges are approached by design flow enhancements such
as safety analysis and automated insertion of safety measures
followed by fault campaigning to validate the architecture
together with the safety mechanisms.
For instance, to avoid Common Cause Failures (CCFs),
critical systems can replicate components and slightly change
some of their characteristics, so even though they are identical
in functionality, a fault affecting the replicated components
will manifest in different ways, therefore enabling its detection
and preventing a fault from becoming a failure. In that regard,
most commercial processors [7], [10] implement a Dual Core
LockStep (DCLS) which consists in replicating two identical
cores executing identical software but staggering their execu-
tion some clock cycles. In that way, if a random fault occurs
at the same time in both cores, it will affect two different
processor states and when outputs are compared the fault will
be detected.
DLCS comes at the expense of more area and power
and sacrifice the computational performance of at least the
replicated cores, since those are entirely dedicated to replicate
the execution of a task. Under current performance demands,
devoting cores to code replication might imply that the most
performance demanding applications cannot be executed prop-
erly or will suffer from lack of resources.
In that regard, the SELENE platform aims at providing
flexible lockstep, in which critical tasks will have the capabil-
ity of executing in safe mode using ”locksteped” processors
while the more performance demanding and less critical tasks
can switch to a high-performance mode where the cores can
execute distinct software freely. This will provide flexibility
to the SELENE platform and enable its use for the upcoming
applications (e.g. AI). In Figure 3 Hardware Monitoring Unit
(HMU) modules are added and connected to the cores to
enforce lockstep or high-performance mode. This modules
monitor the activity of the cores when needed and mandate
resets or stalls in safety mode.
In safety-critical real-time systems, tasks are allocated
a time budget derived from Worst-Case Execution Time
(WCET) estimates. System integrators must, therefore, provide
evidence that deadlines are met and tasks adhere to their time
budgets. Typically, to obtain such evidence, the timing Vali-
dation and Verification (V&V) process consisted in extensive
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Fig. 3. Particular instance of SELENE platform. Hardware view (left) and logical view (right).
Up until now, end-to-end measurements were enough to
provide evidence of correctness and adherence to the timing
budgets. This was possible because critical hardware platforms
were sufficiently simple so that users could master them and
create specific platform tests that exercised the worst-case
scenarios. However, with the advent of Artificial Intelligence
(AI) and new applications, an increase in computational
performance and complexity is changing the architecture of
critical systems (e.g. by introducing multicores, accelerators)
such that typical forms of timing V&V fall short of providing
the evidence required.
In this context, multicores are the cornerstone of perfor-
mance improvement in real-time systems. The key concept is
to integrate the performance of several processors at a reduced
cost by sharing specific resources. Unfortunately, resource
sharing impacts the timing behavior of tasks that originally
executed in isolation and now have to compete to access
certain processor features. Resource sharing also affects timing
analysis as different tasks exercise different interference, there-
fore, compromising the ability to further integrate the system.
In that regard, end-to-end measurements no longer provide the
detailed information required to integrate tasks in a multicore
platform. For example, anomalous resource contention can be
masked when using end-to-end measurements which do not
provide a break-down in resource contention, thus compro-
mising the V&V and integration effort. Moreover, the end-to-
end approach lacks the information needed to diagnose during
operation time anomalous behavior like deadline overruns. To
address such problem, finer grain solutions involving the use
of Performance Monitoring Units (PMUs) have been proposed
to acknowledge where interference is coming from [5].
Overcoming this challenge is a key aspect of providing the
performance needed in safety-critical platforms. In that regard,
the SELENE platform will provide support for multicore
timing V&V through the implementation of an extended PMU
that will provide fine-grain information allowing the user
to differentiate the sources of timing interference and act
accordingly. SELENE’s PMU will enable the user to reason on
the amount of interference that each shared resource exercises
on the final execution time and which agent is utilizing that
resource. Figure 3 depicts the use of SELENE’s HMUs in a
distributed architecture. Note that PMUs are key component
of this larger monitoring module.
B. Managing complexity to certify software-intensive complex-
systems
There is a preference in industry to manage safety related
elements independent of their context. A recent materialization
of this notion is SEooC (Safety Element out of Context) in ISO
26262 Ed 2 Part 10. Furthermore, traditional OS or middleware
elements (e.g. network stacks) have been certified independent
of a specific use-case and then used as ”drop-in” safe-OS.
Nevertheless, looking at the history of those pre-certified OS
elements, it can be concluded that they were not pre-certified
from the start but rather, after being deployed in multiple
contexts, a common base emerged and was then subjected
to certification. From the SELENE perspective, the relevant
question is, therefore, whether this could be immediately
applied to GNU/Linux after 10 years of experience using it in
some safety-critical systems [9]. As explained in the following
paragraphs, we foresee this as not doable due to the significant
increase of the overall complexity of the system software.
IEC 61508 defines 2 basic types of elements: Type-A (low
complexity) and Type-B (high-complexity or formally simply
non-low complexity). Type-A is roughly defined as systems
where (1) all failure modes are known, (2) behavior under
fault condition is understood and (3) adequate data is available
to support the claims. Type-B is a system where one of these
three conditions is not satisfied. Whereas the certification of
the traditional OS out-of-context mentioned before was based
on the accomplishment of Type-A conditions, in highly com-
plex systems targeted by SELENE clearly all three conditions
for Type-A are violated.
Not only that, but the past certification of GNU/Linux
based safety-critical systems was only possible due to the
accomplishment of the following assumptions: 1) simplicity
of safety related software systems and 2) total ignorance of
security aspects as well as 3) assumption of static configuration
over the life-time of systems (or very infrequent updates). Now
again, in the anticipated highly complex autonomous systems
targeted by SELENE, these assumptions will necessarily be
violated.
In order to ensure that these software-intensive complex
systems can provide the required services with a tolerable level
of risk while considering economic constraints, the following
key aspects of system engineering need to be addressed: (1)
minimizing the design, (2) managing dynamics of change, and
(3) joining safety and security. Finally we see potentials in
actually reversing the approach and anticipate capitalizing on
complexity rather than trying to keep systems simple.
Design minimization. Based on the preliminary conclusions
of SIL2LinuxMP project [14] SELENE proposal is to im-
plement this paradigm by maximizing the context awareness
when selecting and configuring elements: functional, architec-
tural, safety, security context. In this way, it is possible to
know what part of an element is intended for use under what
specific constraints and then only is the impact of deviation
from design intent understandable. For example, if we know
that memory allocation is done only before any safety related
activities commence, then we can either assess the potential
impact of memory allocation failures as negligible (unlikely)
or mitigate them by use-case specific measures that only cover
those specific aspects of the memory allocations functional
variety that pertain to hazardous consequences.
In other words, managing complexity by maximizing con-
textual constraints will be the starting point for SELENE.
Much like traditional RTOS and generic safety related com-
ponents, we first must gain adequate understanding under
severely limiting conditions and then expand from there on,
by extraction of commonalities, to a (partially) context inde-
pendent verified/trusted subset at the design level.
Managing dynamics of change, and joining safety and
security. At the code level limiting dynamics will simply
never be achievable due to the change rates, so we need
other strategies to manage dynamics. These will mandate the
ability to perform impact analysis in a very short time (24-
48h) allowing to respond to critical situations as well as an
update strategy that allows to temporarily impose limitations
on systems (for the initial analysis respectively fix-rollout
time) followed by a seamless continuation of operations after a
transparent update. Clearly this has significant impact on the
methodology and procedural aspects of certification and the
overall socio-technical systems life-time.
Capitalize on complexity. One of the most significant changes
that safety related autonomous systems are undergoing is
the increase in system complexity. While most will agree to
that, the definition of complexity (e.g. as outlined by Melany
Mitchell in [11]) and the impact of the same on safety is
not so clear. For the later guiding standards like IEC 61508
essentially strive to avoid it as the root of (almost) all evil
expressed well in its association of complexity with limited
ability to understand 1
Complexity is commonly associated with emerging proper-
ties - that is properties that are not present in the individual
1IEC 24765 3.500 complexity: 1. the degree to which a system’s design
or code is difficult to understand because of numerous components or
relationships among components 2. pertaining to any of a set of structure-
based metrics that measure the attribute in (1). 3. the degree to which a system
or component has a design or implementation that is difficult to understand
and verify.
elements comprising the overall system, but rather proper-
ties that only manifest themselves in the interaction of the
connected elements (via intended and unintended interfaces).
The direct result is that for complex safety related systems
the previous divide and conquer strategies painfully fail and
assurance is bound to our ability to analyze the system as a
whole. Nevertheless we as humans have quite limited abilities
to analyze complex systems without the guidance by ”law
of parsimony” in its different guises. To regain the ability
to manage highly complex systems analytically we need an
orthogonal approach to ”divide and conquer” and this approach
may be ”contextualization” - with other words boil down the
context to an absolute minimum so as to allow expenditure on
the increased behavioral interdependence.
At the same time, we need a change of strategic focus.
Complexity shall no longer be viewed solely as an unfortunate
and unavoidable byproduct of advanced systems but needs
to be viewed as an opportunity to mitigate failures too.
How could this be achieved ? For instance, systematic faults
introduced not by the faulty functionality of the individual
element but by their interaction with other elements can profit
from the non-deterministic behaviour of complex systems. In
other words - viewing a function as a black-box in a complex
system - if a desired property implementation results in a deter-
ministic interaction then traditional analysis suffices, else the
non-reproducibility as a palpable manifestation of complexity
implies that concurrent executions would potentially divert and
thus be diverse to some extent. Arguments building on such
inherent properties of complex systems are the can-of-worms
they present us with to extend our safety functional mitigation
toolbox.
Identifying the potentials of complex systems - loosely cou-
pled lock-step inherent diversity [12] or logical isolation [1] as
well as a number of non-deterministic methods employed in
security need to be added to our safety tool-box. This changed
view on complexity may allow us to address common cause
faults or mitigate unavoidable undesired interference - to single
out just two - in complex systems, so that we can capitalize
on complexity rather than continue the long lost battle for
perceived simplicity. One of the few things that seems sure is
that complexity in safety related systems is here to stay.
V. USE-CASES
A. Human Space-Flight
Since the beginning of the Columbus project, Airbus De-
fence and Space played a key role in the engineering that lead
to a unique and successful conjoint history of the International
Space Station.
In terms of safety critical and high reliable equipments,
the Columbus flight module infrastructure subsystems present
many examples. The major subsystems, namely Thermal
Control System (TCS), Environmental Control/Life Support
Subsystem (ECLSS), Data Management System (DMS) and
Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS) constitute the
safety critical infrastructure elements which make up the
Columbus Module basic functionality. They provide and con-
trol the environment for the astronauts to live in, as well as
the cooling, electrical and data interfaces for the experiments
which are executed inside the Columbus module.
Airbus continuously considers portability and replaceability
of subsystems due to component deprecation. SELENE will
help to build the foundation of future hardware and software
solutions of the Columbus module.
SELENE will also impact future space missions of mankind.
For instance the space Gateway is a new intended space station
in the lunar orbit. It is planed to be built within the next
upcoming years and will fulfill two main objectives. It enables
humans to go back to the moon and it is the first step for a
mission to Mars.
Human space-flight relies more and more on deep integrated
support by robotic equipment to increase autonomy and allows
the astronauts to focus on their essential work. One example of
robotic arms under investigation by AirbusDS is the CAESAR
[2] of DLR. We expect from SELENE to be the basis for more
demanding robotic arm use-cases, for instance in the context
of in-space assembly [16]. Within the scope of SELENE, we
expect following tasks:
• The multi-core platform of SELENE will allows us test
the execution mixed critically application of the robotic
arm, separating for instance the telemetry tasks from the
robotic control unit.
• We will benchmark if SELENE is capable to increase
the computational power for demanding operations in
comparison to previous used space grade equipment.
• Especially, we intend to explore the provided AI-
acceleration of SELENE to check whether it meets future
requirements of the image processing that is essential for
the operation and includes a huge safety impact.
B. Very Integrated Satellite Architecture
State of the art data management and control in Satellite
platform systems is currently implemented on single pro-
cessors and typically composed of the Attitude and Orbit
Control system, the housekeeping and management functions
at satellite, platform and payload levels including Failure
Detection Isolation and Recovery mechanisms, and the Data
Management System. The global criticality level is usually
homogeneous among all those software components, which
are validated and qualified as a whole monolithic piece of
software.
With the increase of processing power and the push for
reducing costs, weight, volume and power consumption, inte-
grated and modular architectures have been recently deployed,
thanks to partitioned execution platform based on hypervisors.
This enabled the integration on a single computer of the
aforementioned Central Software functions together with the
more demanding data processing functions such as GNSS and
Star Tracker applications which were historically implemented
in separate computing devices.
In future systems, with more CPU performance available
on board and more use of mainstream standards from other
industrial and commercial domains, the processing power
could become sufficient to integrate almost all computing
functions on a single device for many types of spacecrafts, in
particular also the payload control and data processing func-
tions. SELENE supports such opportunity by supporting mixed
criticality and providing the necessary safety and dependability
assurance.
Within the SELENE project, the satellite use case aims at
highlighting and demonstrating the following objective and
benefits:
• Simplification of S/W system integration thanks to incre-
mental application development and validation
• Fulfillment of both mixed criticality and high perfor-
mance requirements
• Simplification of the payload processing design thanks
to usage of execution platform with Linux available on-
board
• Reduction of cost, weight, volume and power consump-
tion through software and hardware integration
C. Autonomous Robot
The Smart Physical Demonstration and Evaluation Robot
(SPIDER) is an autonomous vehicle, with omni-directional
movement capabilities, a weight of around 380kg and a top
speed of 50km/h, developed by Virtual Vehicle Research
GmbH. Given the technical specification, the SPIDER has
to fulfill highest requirements regarding safety and security
preventing human harm. The technologies covered in this
demonstrator in which safe and autonomous decisions are
required span from autonomous vehicles, to robotics, and
automation industry. In this demonstrator we are deploying
the Linux OS on top of multi-core architectures prototyped
in FPGAs that are similar to the ones found in commercial
boards for autonomous systems in the edge layer.
The SELENE platform will be integrated into the SPIDER
to run two safety and security-relevant vehicle functions,
namely the collision avoidance function (CoA) and the path
tracking function (PTF). In particular, the separation capabili-
ties developed in SELENE are of interest for the SPIDER and
self-driving vehicles, because they ensure freedom from inter-
ference between the two independent functions, as required for
safety-critical functions according to ISO 26262. In addition,
computationally intensive applications, like sensor fusion or
creation of an occupancy grid are executed on the SELENE
platform, in order to verify its applicability for the automotive
market.
D. Automatic accurate stopping and safe passenger transfer
based on CV&AI-enhanced techniques
CAF Signalling is involved in different research projects
related to Computer Vision (CV) and Artificial Intelligence
(AI) enhanced systems developed in order to reach a higher
autonomy in urban vehicles and align them with railway Euro-
pean normative. The objective is to apply CV&AI techniques
to improve different autonomous train operation functionalities
such as precision stop, visual odometry, rolling stock coupling
operation or person and obstacle detection-identification in
railroads.
However, similar to many companies across the sector,
CAF Signalling is facing different computational capabilities
challenges for CV&AI-enhanced autonomous train operation
which needs real-time & safety-critical computing platforms
for correct performance. The future of CV&AI breakthroughs
in the railway sector will require large arrays of memory
devices at the same accuracy as a Graphical Processing Unit
(GPU)-based system, hardware accelerators and new plat-
forms. These achievements will expand the scale of CV&AI
processing-calculations making them larger and faster (this
means energy-efficiency must improve dramatically).
CAF Signalling will use the SELENE approach on CV&AI-
enabled computing platforms to execute some functionalities
developed in CV&AI field for autonomous train operation.
More precisely, SELENEs project use case will focus on:
• Automatic platform detection The system will detect
the platform area based on train localization information
(odometry sensors, balise information . . . ) and differ-
ent visual pattern (visual sensors) detection/identification
(characteristic patterns which identifies train platforms).
Platform detection functionality will enable CV&AI
based automatic train approximation to accurate train
stop.
• Automatic accurate stop at door equipped platforms
aligning the vehicle and platform doors The system
will perform precise localisation inside platform area
using visual patterns detection, identification and tracking
in order to reach an accurate stopping point and managing
automatic train operation (traction and brake commands,
ATO functionality). The visual patterns will be designed
and chosen to maximize the detection and identification
processes results in any possible lightness and meteoro-
logical conditions. On the other hand, these patterns will
be installed according to predefined precise distances to
obtain physically accurate measurement from correctly
calibrated visual sensors.
• Safe passenger transfer The system will manage auto-
matic safe door enabling (ERMTS functionality), making
sure the train is completely stopped in the platform area
(using visual sensors) avoiding door opening operation if
the train and platform doors are not precisely aligned.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have described the hardware and software
components of the H2020 Self-Monitored Dependable plat-
form for High-Performance Safety-critical Systems (SELENE)
project and the applications that will be used to demonstrate
its capabilities.
The focus of SELENE is the development of an open
platform for high-performance safety-related applications us-
ing the RISC-V instruction set architecture. To that end,
the SELENE platorm will incorporate built-in support for
functional safety in hardware and software to facilitate the
certification of complex applications. The SELENE platform
is based on the NOEL-V processor and open-source software
components like GNU/Linux, the Jailhouse hypervisor, and the
European Distributed Deep Learning Library (EDDL).
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